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INTRODUCTION 
Shareholder participation in corporate governance and investor 
activism are topics du jour in the United States and around the world. In 
the early part of the 20th century, Professors Berle and Means considered 
that shareholder participation was impossible in the transformed 
commercial world that they described in The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property.1 This was a world characterized by dispersed and 
vulnerable shareholders, in which owners do not manage, and managers 
do not own, the corporation.2 In such an environment, the goal of corporate 
law became one of protecting shareholder interests rather than providing 
shareholders with participation rights. 
The structure of capital markets and profile of shareholders in the 
United States today is dramatically different from that time. The rise of 
institutional investors challenged the idea that the only possible paradigm 
in corporate law is one of shareholder protection. Shareholder 
participation in corporate governance is not only feasible but a 
contemporary reality.3 
As this Article demonstrates, however, there are competing 
narratives about shareholders and their right to participate in corporate 
governance around the world. Although a negative view underpins much 
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 1. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). 
 2. Id. at x. 
3. See Jennifer G. Hill, The Trajectory of American Corporate Governance: Shareholder 
Empowerment and Private Ordering Combat 31–34 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 
343, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2921692 [https://perma.cc/K36Q-
LA7Y].  
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recent debate in the United States, a diametrically opposite view of 
shareholder power and activism has gained traction in many jurisdictions 
outside the United States.4 This Article focuses on one manifestation of 
this positive view of shareholders, namely shareholder stewardship codes, 
which originated in the United Kingdom following the 2007–2008 global 
financial crisis and are now proliferating throughout the world.5 
These competing narratives concerning the role of shareholders in 
corporate governance have significant regulatory implications. In 
particular, the narratives pose challenges to regulators, who attempt to 
differentiate between “good activists” and “bad activists.” 
I. EVOLVING OWNERSHIP PATTERNS AND COMPETING 
NARRATIVES CONCERNING SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
Ownership patterns in the United States today are very different from 
those when Berle and Means wrote The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, in which they depicted shareholders as a dispersed group 
requiring legal protection due to their inability to act collectively.6 By the 
1990s, shareholder engagement in corporate governance and activism had 
become feasible7 given the rise of powerful institutional investors.8 The 
subsequent emergence of hedge funds revealed the possibility of new 
activist techniques and strategies.9 
                                                     
4. See generally Jennifer G. Hill, Images of the Shareholder–Shareholder Power and 
Shareholder Powerlessness, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 53–57 (Jennifer G. 
Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015). 
 5. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., G20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 31–32 (2015) [hereinafter OECD 2015]; Ruth Sullivan, UK Seen as Model for 
Stewardship Guidelines, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2010), https://www.ft.com/content/0e0bbc50-9c02-
11df-a7a4-00144feab49a. 
 6. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 78. This ever-widening shareholder dispersion increased 
the danger of entrenched managerial power, effectively creating “ownerless corporations.” See 
Andrew G. Haldane, Chief Economist, Bank of Eng.,  Speech “Who Owns A Company?” given at 
University of Edinburgh Corporate Finance Conference 8, 11 (May 22, 2015), http://www. 
bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2015/speech833.pdf [https://perma.cc/4H67-
CJYB]. 
 7. Marco Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the 
Hermes UK Focus Fund, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3093, 3119–21 (2009); Bernard S. Black & John C. 
Coffee Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behaviour Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 1997, 2001–07 (1994); Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder 
Activism in the United States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55 (2007).  
 8. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 572–74 (1990). 
 9. William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1401–10 
(2007); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 63 J. 
FIN. 1729, 1745–46 (2008); Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present and Future of 
Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 60–61 (2011); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. 
Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1029–
43 (2007). 
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Today, financial institutions dominate the capital markets in many, 
but by no means all,10 jurisdictions. In the United States, for example, 
institutional investor shareholding in the top 1,000 U.S. corporations, 
which stood at less than ten percent in the early 1950s, has now risen to 
over seventy percent.11 This pattern is even more pronounced in the United 
Kingdom, where around ninety percent of shares are held by financial 
institutions, approximately half of which are non-U.K.-based.12 There has 
also been massive growth in financial intermediation in Australia as a 
result of the introduction of a mandatory private pension (superannuation) 
system in the early 1990s, with Australian fund managers responsible for 
a fund pool of approximately A$3 trillion.13 There have been analogous 
developments in major Asian financial centers, such as Hong Kong and 
Singapore.14 
                                                     
 10. In parts of Asia, for example, concentrated ownership, such as state-, family- or founder-
owned companies, continues to be the dominant paradigm. There are also high levels of share trading 
by individuals. In Taiwan, for example, more than sixty percent of share trading is conducted by 
individuals, as opposed to institutional, investors. Christopher Chen, Taiwan, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN ASIA (Bruce E. Aronson & Joongi Kim eds., forthcoming 2018). 
 11. Robert B. Thompson, The Power of Shareholders in the United States, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 441, 447 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015); 
Suneela Jain et al., The Conference Board Governance Center White Paper: What is the Optimal 
Balance in the Relative Roles of Management, Directors, and Investors in the Governance of Public 
Corporations? 9 (2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://tcbblogs.org/public_html/wp-content/ 
uploads/The%20Conference%20Board%20Governance%20Center%20White%20Paper.pdf. 
 12. Paul Davies, Shareholders in the United Kingdom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
SHAREHOLDER POWER 355, 356 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015). On the changing 
nature of the U.K. shareholder structure, see generally ENERGY AND INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY 
COMMITTEE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THIRD REPORT OF SESSION 2016–17, HC 702, §§ 13–16 
(UK), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmbeis/702/702.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Y5BK-CUYJ]; see also Haldane, supra note 6, at 11 (noting that the fraction of shares held 
by individuals in the United Kingdom has dropped from around fifty percent in the 1960s to a little 
over ten percent today, and most of those individual holdings are now indirectly held through financial 
intermediaries). Ownership of shares by foreign investors is even higher in some other European 
jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, where it has been estimated that foreign investors own over 
seventy percent of the equity market. See Sullivan, supra note 5. 
 13. See, e.g., Press Release, Fin. Servs. Council, FSC Launches Internal Governance and Asset 
Stewardship Standard (July 19, 2017), https://www.fsc.org.au/_entity/annotation/86955911-0f6c-
e711-8103-c4346bc5c274 [https://perma.cc/P5W2-2N3G]; AUSTL. GOV’T TREASURY, FINANCIAL 
SYSTEMS INQUIRY FINAL REPORT § 2 (2014), http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/12/FSI_Final_Report_ 
Consolidated20141210.pdf [https://perma.cc/27Z5-UAXZ]. 
 14. See Ernest Lim & Luh Luh Lan, The Role of Institutional Investors in Singapore and Hong 
Kong: Stewardship Codes and Ownership Engagement (unpublished manuscript) (presented at the 
Corporate Governance and Regulation: East Meets West Conference at the  Univ. of Sydney (Aug. 
17–18, 2017)). Professors Lim and Lan note that between 2007 and 2017, the number of mutual funds 
domiciled in Singapore and Hong Kong rose from 86 to 197 (Singapore) and from 61 to 323 (Hong 
Kong). Id. During the same period, assets under management of domiciled funds in each jurisdiction 
grew from $10 billion to $30 billion (Singapore) and from $19 billion to $92.4 billion (Hong Kong). 
Id. Nonetheless, many Asian markets, including Hong Kong, are dominated by family- and state-
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These major capital market shifts, which Professors Gilson and 
Gordon have labeled “agency capitalism,” have important implications for 
investor activism and regulation.15 According to Gilson and Gordon, a 
feature of contemporary agency capitalism is that institutional investors 
are “sophisticated but reticent.”16 This means that, although these financial 
institutions are unlikely to initiate activist conduct, other more aggressive 
market players, such as hedge funds, may persuade them to join forces and 
engage in such conduct.17 
As the profile of shareholders has changed, so too has their image, 
which has become increasingly ambiguous, particularly since the global 
financial crisis. Two competing narratives are apparent in current 
comparative corporate governance—these are the narratives of the “bad 
activist” versus the “good activist.”  
a. The Negative Narrative 
A negative perception of investors, or at least certain types of 
investors, pervades much of the contemporary U.S. debate concerning the 
role of shareholders in corporate governance. This narrative portrays some 
shareholders as unfaithful participants in the corporate enterprise.18 Time 
horizons play a significant role in the negative narrative, which also 
suggests that many investors are myopic and prone to destructive short-
termism.19 Proxy advisers are often tarred with the same brush.20 
According to Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, and Katz, for example, hedge fund 
                                                     
owned companies.  See John Kong Shan Ho, Bringing Responsible Ownership to the Financial Market 
of Hong Kong: How Effective Could It Be?, 16 J. CORP. L. STUD. 437, 446–52 (2016). 
 15. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Agency Capitalism: Further Implications of Equity 
Intermediation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 32 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall 
S. Thomas eds., 2015). 
16. Id. at 33. 
 17. Id. 
 18. They are variously portrayed as predatory, disloyal, or both, to their ultimate beneficiaries. 
See generally Hill, supra note 4. 
 19. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed 
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 790–92 (2015); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Protect 
Industry from Predatory Speculators, FIN. TIMES (July 8, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
fac881b6-6be5-11de-9320-00144feabdc0. The idea that activist shareholders are myopic and short-
termist has exerted an increasingly powerful influence in U.S. corporate law literature. For a discussion 
of this literature, see generally Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1093–96 (2015). For a recent challenge to the widely held view that the 
ideal shareholder is therefore a long-term investor, see Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Myth of the Ideal 
Investor, 41 SEATTLE. U. L. REV. 425 (2018). 
 20. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction 
to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 484 (2014). 
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activists are “profoundly destructive to the long-term health of companies 
and the American economy.”21 
This view of shareholders gained ground as a result of the global 
financial crisis. Some commentators suggested, for example, that 
shareholders were “more instigators than victims” of flawed executive 
compensation schemes that prompted corporate managers to engage in 
excessive risk-taking.22 The negative narrative of investors has also been 
an influential theme in the U.S. shareholder empowerment and proxy 
access debates.23 
This negative perception of investors has important regulatory 
implications. It suggests that investor engagement in corporate governance 
and activism is dangerous, both to the corporation and to society as a 
whole. It flips the traditional Berle–Means goal of protecting shareholders 
on its head by suggesting that the modern goal of corporate law should be 
to protect the corporation from certain investors. A clear example of this 
approach is Martin Lipton’s recommendation that any new U.S. legislation 
or regulation should include protection for companies against shareholder 
pressure.24 
The negative narrative of shareholders is by no means restricted to 
the United States. In Germany in 2005, following the ouster of Werner G. 
Seifert from his position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the German 
Stock Exchange, short-term shareholders, such as hedge funds, were 
described as “swarms of locusts.”25 In 2008, a senior member of Japan’s 
                                                     
 21. See Martin Lipton, Do Activist Hedge Funds Really Create Long-Term Value?, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 22, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2014/07/22/do-activist-hedge-funds-really-create-long-term-value/  [https://perma.cc/N5TU-JEPS]. 
 22. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for 
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 799 (2011). 
 23. See Hill, supra note 3; Jennifer G. Hill, The Rising Tension Between Shareholder and 
Director Power in the Common Law World, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 344 (2010). 
 24. Martin Lipton, Will a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance Bring Peace to the Thirty 
Years’ War, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 2, 2015), https://corpgov. 
law.harvard.edu/2015/10/05/will-a-new-paradigm-for-corporate-governance-bring-peace/ [https:// 
perma.cc/LV93-CAJD]. 
 25. See Franz Müntefering, Chairman of the Soc. Democratic Party,  Speech “Freiheit und 
Verantwortung” at Friedrich Ebert Found. in Berlin (Nov. 19, 2004), http://www.franz-
muentefering.de/reden/pdf/19.11.04.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4B9-RF39]; Mark Landler & Heather 
Timmons, Poison Ink Aimed at ‘Locusts,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2006/03/31/business/media/poison-ink-aimed-at-locusts.html. The “swarms of locusts” metaphor is 
reminiscent of references in the U.S. context to hedge funds as “wolf packs.” E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. 
& Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 
41 J. CORP. L. 545, 562–68 (2016); Carmen X. W. Lu, Unpacking Wolf Packs, 125 YALE L.J. 773, 
773–77 (2016); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective 
on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1871–
908 (2017). 
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Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) described shareholders 
as greedy, “fickle,” and “irresponsible,” expecting high dividends while 
simultaneously shirking responsibility.26 In Korea, corporate law 
amendments in 2007 imposed criminal sanctions on foreign investors 
seeking to exert an “influence on control” of Korean firms, and this 
concept extended to shareholder demands for higher dividends.27 In 2015, 
an ultimately unsuccessful attempt by U.S. hedge fund Elliott 
Management to block a family-controlled acquisition of Samsung C&T in 
Korea provoked an anti-Semitic response, which was a shocking and 
extreme example of the view of foreign investors as predatory.28  
Recent activist demands made against companies in the Asia-Pacific 
region have been variously described as bullying and short-termist,29 
dangerous to the industry, and attempting to manipulate the markets.30 In 
                                                     
 26. These comments were made in response to pressure by the activist U.S. investment fund 
Steel Partners against the managers of Sapporo, a Japanese beer company, in which Steel Partners had 
a 19% stake. Activist Investors in Japan: Samurai v Shareholders, ECONOMIST (Feb. 14, 2008), 
http://www.economist.com/node/10698467 [https://perma.cc/J658-MGGA]. For discussion of 
subsequent difficulties experienced by Steel Partners in seeking to replace many of Sapporo’s 
directors, see Michiyo Nakamoto, Steel Partners Dealt Fresh Setback in Japan, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 30, 
2010), https://www.ft.com/content/d4322b14-3bd9-11df-9412-00144feabdc0. 
 27. Kon Sik Kim, Dynamics of Shareholder Power in Korea, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
SHAREHOLDER POWER 535, 540 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015). 
 28. See Ken Kurson, Samsung Reacts to Observer, Deletes Anti-Semitic ‘Vulture Man’ Cartoons, 
OBSERVER (July 15, 2015, 12:55 PM), http://observer.com/2015/07/breaking-samsung-reacts-to-
observer-deletes-anti-semitic-vulture-man-cartoons/ [https://perma.cc/4TSZ-B6L5]. 
 29. For example, Hong Kong’s Bank of East Asia, which was the target of an activist campaign 
by Elliott Management, accused the hedge fund of “bullying tactics [that] only seek to serve their own 
short-term interests, and not the interests of the bank’s shareholders as a whole.” Alun John, What is 
Bank of East Asia and Elliott’s Dispute About?, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 18, 2017), 
http://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/2103138/what-bank-east-asia-and-elliotts-
dispute-about [https://perma.cc/Y4KD-KWHH]; see also Mia Lamar, Hedge Fund Elliott Calls on 
Bank of East Asia to Sell, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund-elliott-
calls-on-bank-of-east-asia-to-sell-1454575546. Similarly, the general manager of a venerable 
Japanese company, Katakura Industries Co., described the suggestions of a Hong Kong-based activist 
hedge, Oasis Management Co., fund as “extremely short-term.” Lisa Pham, Activist Hedge Fund 
Battles 144-Year-Old Firm to Ditch Low-Return Ventures, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 4, 2017), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/04/04/business/corporate-business/activist-hedge-fund-
battles-144-year-old-firm-ditch-low-return-ventures/ [https://perma.cc/VS3S-D24C]. 
 30. The actor George Clooney entered into debate about the activist campaign by Daniel S. Loeb 
against the Japanese company Sony, describing Mr. Loeb as a “carpet bagger” who was dangerous to 
the industry and trying to manipulate the market. Michael J. de la Merced, George Clooney Rebuts 
Loeb’s Critique of Sony, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 2, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2013/08/02/george-clooney-rebuts-loebs-critique-of-sony/ [https://perma.cc/Z7AX-63MX]; see 
Nathan Vardi, George Clooney Attacks Hedge Fund Billionaire Dan Loeb, FORBES (Aug. 2, 2013), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2013/08/02/george-clooney-attacks-hedge-fund-
billionaire-dan-loeb/ [https://perma.cc/E5JS-RG9G]. 
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the case of Elliott Management’s “brazen foray”31 against mining 
company BHP Billiton Ltd.,32 Australia’s Treasurer, Scott Morrison, 
weighed in on the debate, stating that one of Elliott Management’s 
demands33 would amount to a criminal offense and be contrary to the 
national interest.34 
b. The Positive Narrative 
There is, however, a powerful alternative narrative about shareholder 
activism in modern comparative corporate governance. This narrative, 
which is common outside the United States, views increased shareholder 
power and engagement in corporate governance in a distinctly positive 
light. According to this analysis, the problem during the global financial 
crisis was not too much shareholder pressure on management but too little. 
As John Plender lamented in relation to the crisis, “where were the 
shareholders?”35 
Comments made in 2015 by Andy Haldane, Chief Economist at the 
Bank of England, reveal a positive narrative of shareholder engagement. 
According to Mr. Haldane: 
                                                     
 31. John Kehoe, Elliott’s BHP Billiton Hit Shows Activist Hedge Funds Target Australia, AUSTL. 
FIN. REV. (Apr. 18, 2017), http://www.afr.com/business/elliotts-bhp-billiton-hit-shows-activist-
hedge-funds-target-australia-20170416-gvlq3c [https://perma.cc/F2YZ-N64W]. The CEO of BHP 
Billiton Ltd. described Elliott Management’s activist campaign against his company as “crude 
financial engineering.” Id. 
 32. Prior to Elliott Management’s campaign against BHP Billiton Ltd., shareholder activism in 
Australia had generally been limited to homegrown activist institutions, which tended to target small 
to medium companies for poor performance or corporate governance practices. Id.   
 33. Namely, Elliott Management’s demand that BHP Billiton Ltd. collapse its dual British–
Australian listing and to eliminate its listing on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). See Press 
Release, Hon. Scott Morrison MP, Treasurer of Austl.,Treasurer’s Statement on Elliott’s BHP 
Proposal (May 4, 2017), http://sjm.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release/041-2017/ [https:// 
perma.cc/A2YP-Q2PL]. 
 34. See id. According to the Treasurer, it would be “unthinkable that any Australian Government 
could allow this original Big Australian to head offshore.” The rationale for Mr. Morrison’s claim that 
this would also be illegal was the fact that in 2001 one of the protective conditions that the then-
Treasurer of Australia, Peter Costello, imposed in agreeing to a merger between BHP Ltd. and Billiton 
Plc. was that BHP Billiton Ltd. should remain listed on the ASX. According to Mr. Morrison, if BHP 
Billiton Ltd. were to implement Elliott Management’s demands contrary to the 2001 condition, this 
could constitute a criminal offence under Australia’s Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act of 1975, 
exposing both BHP Billiton Ltd. and its directors to liability. Following the comments by the 
Treasurer, Elliott Management proposed a new plan under which the dual listing would be collapsed 
into an Australian-listed, rather than a UK-listed, company. See Matthew Stevens, Opinion, Elliott’s 
BHP Billiton Assault Takes a Toxic Turn, AUSTL. FIN. REV. (May 16, 2017), 
http://www.afr.com/business/elliotts-bhp-assault-takes-a-toxic-turn-20170516-gw650n 
[https://perma.cc/KUC9-M74Y]. 
 35. John Plender, Shut Out, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/fac648d6-
9c76-11dd-a42e-000077b07658. 
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One consequence of a more dispersed and disinterested 
ownership structure is that it becomes harder to exert 
influence over management, increasing the risk of sub-
optimal decision-making. There is some empirical support 
for this hypothesis. For example, companies tend to have 
higher valuations when institutional shareholders are a large 
share of cashflow, perhaps reflecting their stewardship role 
in protecting the firm from excessive risk-taking.36 
A positive view of shareholder engagement also underpinned several 
recommendations of the 2012 U.K. Kay Review,37 which was established 
to review the impact of activity in U.K. equity markets on the long-term 
performance and governance of U.K. listed companies.38 Although the 
Kay Review concluded that short-termism was indeed a problem in U.K. 
equity markets,39 it also considered that increased shareholder engagement 
and collective action constituted one of the potential solutions to that 
problem. Specifically, the Kay Review recommended establishing an 
“investors’ forum”40 to promote enhanced collective engagement by 
institutional shareholders and to serve as a contact point between a 
company and its main shareholders for discussions of issues such as the 
appointment of a chairman and non-executive directors.41 This approach 
to shareholder engagement is also supported by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) under its Principles of 
Corporate Governance.42 
This positive narrative treats investors as having an important 
participatory role in corporate governance, which is integral to 
                                                     
 36. Haldane, supra note 6, at 11. Similarly, Denmark’s Minister for Business and Growth, Troels 
Lund Poulsen, has spoken positively about increased shareholder engagement in corporate 
governance, stating “[i]t benefits Danish competitiveness if institutional investors use their influence 
and skills to help Danish companies operate in the best possible way.” Rachel Fixsen, Denmark to 
Draft Scheme Inspired by UK’s Stewardship Code, INVS. & PENSIONS EUR. (Jan. 28, 2016), 
https://www.ipe.com/news/esg/denmark-to-draft-scheme-inspired-by-uks-stewardship-code/ 
10011667.fullarticle [https://perma.cc/5MBU-VZVM]. In accordance with this viewpoint, Ashley 
Alder, Chief Executive Officer of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission and Chairman 
of IOSCO, has raised concerns about the disproportionate growth of passive investment funds, which 
may have little interest in holding boards accountable. See John Sedgwick, Hong Kong Warns on 
Passive Governance Standards, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
ffb3b86c-096c-11e7-97d1-5e720a26771b. 
 37. THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG TERM DECISION-MAKING, FINAL 
REPORT (July 2012), http://www.ecgi.org/conferences/eu_actionplan2013/documents/kay_review_ 
final_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8ZX-RLJ8]. 
 38. Id. at 9. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 9, 13, 50–51. 
 41. Id. at 63. 
 42. OECD 2015, supra note 5. 
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accountability. It supports a radically different regulatory response to its 
negative counterpart, suggesting that shareholders should be granted 
stronger rights, encouraged to make greater use of their existing powers to 
engage with the companies in which they invest, or both.43  
The positive narrative underpins several post-crisis reforms44 that 
harness increased shareholder engagement as a regulatory technique in its 
own right.45 One prominent example of this trend is “say on pay,” which 
became a popular regulatory technique around the world following the 
crisis.46 An advisory vote by shareholders on remuneration was introduced 
in the United States for the first time under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.47 
In jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Australia, which already 
had a non-binding “say on pay” vote for shareholders, the crisis led to a 
strengthening of shareholders’ power in relation to executive pay. In the 
United Kingdom, shareholders now have an additional binding vote on 
remuneration policies.48 In 2011, Australia introduced a distinctive form 
of “say on pay,” the so-called “two strikes” rule.49 Under this rule, a listed 
corporation that suffers two consecutive “strikes”—namely shareholder 
“no” votes of twenty-five percent or more on the annual directors’ 
remuneration report—must put a “spill resolution” to its shareholders. If 
successful, this resolution requires all board members to submit to 
reelection by the company’s shareholders within ninety days.50 In Europe, 
the revised Shareholders’ Rights Directive grants shareholders an ex ante 
                                                     
 43. See generally Hill, supra note 4. 
 44. Some scholars have strongly criticized these reforms on the basis that they themselves 
constitute a kind of regulatory myopia. See, e.g., Alan J. Dignam, The Future of Shareholder 
Democracy in the Shadow of the Financial Crisis, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 639, 684 (2013) (referring 
to the myth of the good shareholder); see also Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform 
in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309, 310 (2011). According to Professor Bruner, “[I]t is surprising 
that policymakers . . . would seek to empower the very stakeholder group whose incentives are most 
skewed toward the kind of excessive risk-taking that led to the crisis in the first place.” Id. 
 45. See Hill, supra note 4, at 64–68.  
 46. See Roberto Barontini et al., Directors’ Remuneration Before and After the Crisis: 
Measuring the Impact of Reforms in Europe, in BOARDS AND SHAREHOLDERS IN EUROPEAN LISTED 
COMPANIES: FACTS, CONTEXT AND POST-CRISIS REFORMS 251 (Massimo Belcredi & Guido Ferrarini 
eds., 2013). See generally Randall S. Thomas & Christoph Van Der Elst, Say on Pay Around the 
World, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 653 (2015). 
 47. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 48. See Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, 2013 c. 24, § 6 (UK); see also DEP’T FOR 
BUS., INNOVATION & SKILLS, DIRS.’ REMUNERATION REFORMS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 4 
(2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/158048/13-
727-directors-remuneration-reforms-faq.pdf [https://perma.cc/23T3-E6XG]. 
 49. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 250U–250W (Austl.). 
 50. See Hill, supra note 4, at 66–68.  
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vote on remuneration policy, which is in principle binding, and an ex post 
advisory vote on the remuneration report for the prior year. 51 
II. THE RISE AND RISE OF STEWARDSHIP CODES 
Perhaps the clearest example of the influence of the positive narrative 
in comparative corporate governance, however, is the rise of stewardship 
codes, which first appeared in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
These codes indicate that, in some jurisdictions at least, the debate today 
is less about controlling shareholder power than about constraining board 
power by encouraging shareholders to exercise their legal rights and 
increase their level of engagement in corporate governance.52 Stewardship 
codes reflect the view that engagement by institutional investors is an 
integral part of any corporate governance system.53 They represent a 
generalized regulatory response to John Plender’s global financial crisis 
lament—“where were the shareholders?”54 
In 2010, the United Kingdom became the first jurisdiction to adopt a 
stewardship code,55 following a recommendation of the 2009 Walker 
Review on corporate governance in financial institutions.56 A revised 
version of the Code, which operates on a voluntary basis, was released in 
2012.57 The U.K. Stewardship Code made large claims, asserting, for 
example, that “the goal of stewardship is to promote the long term success 
                                                     
 51. See Press Release, Eur. Comm. - Fact Sheet, Shareholders’ Rights Directive Q&A (Mar. 14, 
2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-592_en.htm [https://perma.cc/FW4Y-H4H6]. 
 52. Some stewardship codes, however, also include as part of their policy rationale the goal of 
strengthening the accountability of institutional investors or ensuring that institutional investors fulfill 
their fiduciary duty to their own investors and beneficiaries. See, e.g., MINORITY S’HOLDER 
WATCHDOG GRP., MALAYSIAN CODE FOR INST. INV’R (2014) [hereinafter MSWG CODE], 
https://www.mswg.org.my/the-malaysian-code-for-institutional-investors [https://perma.cc/FDA2-
ZZUK]; TAIWAN STOCK EXCHANGE, STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR INST. INV’R 2 (June 30, 2016) 
[hereinafter TWSE 2016], http://cgc.twse.com.tw/static/stewardship_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BY3-
BUFQ]. 
 53. In South Africa, for example, it has been claimed that the introduction of a stewardship code, 
the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa (CRISA), was a response to recognition that “there 
was a huge gap in the governance system because it failed to include institutional investors.” Nina 
Röhrbein, The Engaged Investor: The South African Code, INV. & PENSIONS EUR. (Feb. 2011), 
https://www.ipe.com/the-engaged-investor-the-south-african-code/38951.fullarticle 
[https://perma.cc/4L6A-QL56]. 
 54. See Plender, supra note 35. 
 55. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE U.K. STEWARDSHIP CODE (July 2010).  
 56. WALKER REVIEW, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTHER 
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS, NATIONAL ARCHIVES UK (Nov. 26, 
2009), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_ 
review_261109.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G5X-X2HV]. 
 57. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE U.K. STEWARDSHIP CODE (Sept. 2012) [hereinafter U.K. 
STEWARDSHIP 2012], https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-b603-
3d24b2f62c5f/UK-Stewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf [https://perma.cc/574N-3X5K]. 
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of companies”58 and that “[e]ffective stewardship benefits companies, 
investors, and the economy as a whole.”59 
These claims proved alluring from a comparativist standpoint, 
providing clear incentives for transplantation.60 Japan became an early 
adopter when, in 2014, it introduced its own version of the stewardship 
code. Many countries, particularly in Asia, have now jumped on the stew-
ardship code bandwagon.61 
The stewardship codes around the world emanate from different 
issuing bodies, and this can influence the effectiveness of a code.62 There 
are at least three distinct categories of stewardship code. The first category 
comprises codes that have been issued by regulators or quasi-regulators on 
behalf of the government. Jurisdictions with stewardship codes of this type 
include: Denmark,63 Hong Kong,64 Kenya,65 Japan,66 Malaysia,67 
                                                     
 58. Id. at 1. 
 59. Id. 
 60. According to Professor Edward Rock, the allure of comparativism lies in the idea that “one 
can fruitfully transplant legal rules or institutions from one system to another . . . . The temptation is 
to try to get something for nothing, or at least at a discount.” Edward B. Rock, America’s Shifting 
Fascination with Comparative Corporate Governance,  74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 368 (1996). 
 61. See EY, Q&A ON STEWARDSHIP CODES 2 (Aug. 2017), http://www.ey.com/Publication/ 
vwLUAssets/ey-stewardship-codes-august-2017/$FILE/ey-stewardship-codes-august-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MVZ6-UYV6]; OECD 2015, supra note 5, at 29–30; Sullivan 2010, supra note 5.  
 62. Lim & Lan, supra note 14. 
 63. See COMM. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, STEWARDSHIP CODE (Nov. 29, 2016) (Den.), https:// 
corporategovernance.dk/sites/default/files/erst_247_opsaetning_af_anbefalinger_for_aktivt_ejerskab
_uk_2k8.pdf [https://perma.cc/V69D-B7VH]. 
 64. SECS. & FUTURES COMM’N, PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBLE OWNERSHIP (Mar. 7, 2016) (H.K.), 
http://cgc.twse.com.tw/static/20160630/0000000054a7dce70155a09e021f001c_Stewardship 
%20Principles%20for%20Institutional%20Investors-20160630.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5Q2-MSLQ]; 
see Kong Shan Ho, supra note 14, at 449 (noting that unlike western markets with dispersed 
ownership, the Hong Kong market is dominated by family-owned and state-owned companies, 
meaning that it may be more productive for investors to engage directly with controlling shareholders, 
rather than the board of directors); see also Lim & Lan, supra note 14 (highlighting differences 
between the powers of the regulatory authorities responsible for the U.K. Stewardship Code and Hong 
Kong’s Principles of Responsible Ownership). 
 65. See The Capital Markets Act, No. 6016 (2017) KENYA GAZETTE No. 81 Cap. 485A (Kenya), 
http://kenyalaw.org/kenya_gazette/gazette/volume/MTUwOA--/Vol.CXIX-No.81 [https://perma.cc/ 
NR3U-L34Q]. 
 66. See COUNCIL OF EXPERTS ON JAPAN’S STEWARDSHIP CODE, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE 
INVESTORS: JAPAN’S STEWARDSHIP CODE 1–2 (Feb. 26, 2014) [hereinafter JAPAN STEWARDSHIP], 
http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/20140407/01.pdf [https://perma.cc/ALN5-T49C]. 
 67. See MSWG CODE, supra note 52.  
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Taiwan,68 and Thailand.69 In March 2017, the Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority (IRDA) became the first Indian regulator to 
promulgate such a code with the release of a draft mandatory Stewardship 
Code for insurance companies.70 It is anticipated that this is the first step 
in the formulation of a generalized set of shareholder stewardship 
principles by a coalition of Indian regulators.71 
A second category of stewardship codes, operating in some other 
countries, are those that have been initiated by various private industry 
participants.72 South Korea is an interesting example of this type of code.73 
Although the South Korean regulator74 sought to introduce its own 
stewardship code in 2015,75 this attempt failed due to strong opposition 
from members of the business community, who claimed that such a code 
would diminish their autonomy and permit excessive interference in 
corporate management by institutional investors.76 However, a private 
organization77 subsequently intervened and successfully steered a 
voluntary stewardship code to adoption in December 2016.78 Other 
                                                     
 68. See TWSE 2016, supra note 52; Taiwan Stock Exchange Launches Stewardship Principles 
for Institutional Investors, MONDOVISIONE (July 7, 2016), http://www.mondovisione.com/media-and-
resources/news/taiwan-stock-exchange-launches-stewardship-principles-for-institutional-investor/ 
[https://perma.cc/D42C-T4NN]. 
 69. See SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE CODE: I CODE FOR INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS (No. AorSorPor, 39/2559) (2017) (Thai.), http://www.sec.or.th/TH/Documents/hearing/ 
hearing_39_2559_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JSW-ATDA]. 
 70. See Inst. Inv’r Advisory Servs., Stewardship Code for India – IRDA Intensifies the Agenda 
(Mar. 24, 2017) (India), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/91c61f_b117c052c5ba4541b104f3569e3a 
e352.pdf [https://perma.cc/WAB3-CRNR]. 
 71. The coalition of Indian regulators comprises the Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(Sebi); IRDA; and the Pension Fund Regulatory Development Authority. See Jayshree P. Upadhyay, 
India to Draft Rules for Institutional Investors Voting on Company Matters, LIVEMINT (Mar. 6, 2017), 
http://www.livemint.com/Companies/0teJ9go8GQPOOrxuAadTeJ/India-to-draft-rules-for-
institutional-investors-voting-on-c.html [https://perma.cc/8UAX-AEMP]. 
 72. EY, supra  note 61, at 2. 
 73. See Mee-Hyon Lee, Introduction of the Stewardship Code in Korea (unpublished manuscript) 
(presented at the Corporate Governance and Regulation: East Meets West Conference at the University 
of Sydney on Aug. 17–18, 2017) (providing an overview of Korea’s adoption of its Stewardship Code). 
 74. Korean Financial Services Commission.  
 75. Lee, supra note 73. 
 76. See Jung Suk-Yee, Financial Services Commission Concentrating on Stewardship Code, 
BUS. KOREA (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/english/news/money/17284-korean-
stewardship-code-financial-services-commission-concentrating-stewardship [https://perma.cc/ZTH9-
8RY4]. 
 77. The private organization was the Korea Corporate Governance Service, which was founded 
in 2002. Its major founding members were the Korea Exchange, the Korea Financial Investment 
Association, the Korea Listed Companies Association, and the KOSDAQ Listed Companies 
Association. See Lee 2017, supra note 73, at 1. 
 78. There is increasing pressure for greater managerial transparency in South Korea as a result 
of the Choi Soon-sil scandal, which ultimately led to the 2017 impeachment of President Park Geun-
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jurisdictions to adopt codes promulgated by industry players of this kind 
include South Africa79 and Singapore.80 
A third type of stewardship code encompasses codes that are initiated 
by investors themselves.81 Investor-led codes, which exist in countries 
such as Australia,82 Brazil,83 Canada,84 Italy,85 the Netherlands,86 and 
                                                     
hye Park. Id. at 1–2. Although Korea’s Stewardship Code is a private initiative, Korea’s Financial 
Services Commission has stated that it will introduce policies that provide incentives for institutional 
investors to adopt the code. See Lee Ho-Jeong, FSC Pushes for Adoption of Stewardship Code, KOREA 
JOONGANG DAILY (Feb. 14, 2017), http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article. 
aspx?aid=3029833 [https://perma.cc/8BGL-Q5CX]. 
 79. See INST. DIRS. S. AFR., CODE FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTING IN SOUTH AFRICA  2011, 
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.iodsa.co.za/resource/resmgr/crisa/crisa_19_july_2011.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/FP26-QXTR]. 
 80. The Singapore Stewardship Principles were issued through the Stewardship Asia Centre 
(SAC). In fact, the Singapore Stewardship Principles straddle all three categories of issuing body 
because the SAC includes both industry players and investment organizations and was established 
under the auspices of Temasek, Singapore’s state-owned sovereign wealth fund. See generally Lim & 
Lam, supra note 14. There is no signatory requirement or “comply or explain” requirement under the 
Singapore Stewardship Principles. Id. 
 81. See generally EY, supra  note 61, at 2. 
 82. See, e.g., Fin. Servs. Council, supra note 13. Australia’s Financial Services Council (FSC) 
released its FSC Standard 23: Principles of Internal Governance and Asset Stewardship in July 2017. 
Compliance with the code is mandatory for all FSC asset-manager members. This applies to 
approximately fifty funds management firms, which manage most of the A$2.8 trillion in funds under 
management in Australia. The code is voluntary for FSC members that outsource investment 
management decisions. See Zilla Efrat, FSC Launches Asset Stewardship Code, INV. MAG. (July 19, 
2017), https://investmentmagazine.com.au/2017/07/fsc-launches-asset-stewardship-code/  [https:// 
perma.cc/4PSE-MG5U].   
 83. ASSOCIAÇÃO DE INVESITDORES NO MERCADO DES CAPITAIS, AMEC STEWARDSHIP CODE 
(2016) (Braz.), https://en.amecbrasil.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/amec-apresentacao-Codigo-
Stewardship_ingles.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R5W-A4FD]. The ICGN has described the focus on ESG 
integration under Principle 3 of the AMEC Stewardship Code as a particularly progressive feature of 
the Brazilian code. See Letter from Erik Breen, Chairman, ICGN Board, to  Asscociacao de 
Investidores no Mercado de Capitals (AMEC), at 2 (July 2016), https://www.icgn.org/sites/default/ 
files/ICGN%20response%20to%20AMEC%20stewardship%20code%20consultation%20July%2020
16.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB97-4AGP]. 
 84. CANADIAN COAL. FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, 2017 CCGG STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES, (May 
2017) (Can.) [hereinafter CCGC 2017], http://admin.yourwebdepartment.com/site/ccgg/assets/pdf/ 
stewardship_principles_public.pdf [https://perma.cc/T296-ZFNK]. 
 85. See, e.g., ASSOGESTIONI, ITALIAN STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR THE EXERCISE OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND VOTING RIGHTS IN LISTED COMPANIES (2016) (It.), https://www.icgn.org/ 
sites/default/files/Italian%20code.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5C4-DW82].  
 86. See EUMEDION, BEST PRACTICES FOR ENGAGED SHARE-OWNERSHIP (June 30, 2011) 
(Neth.), https://www.eumedion.nl/en/public/knowledgenetwork/best-practices/best_practices-
engaged-share-ownership.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT5B-YWL2]. 
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Switzerland,87 reflect a strong self-regulatory approach.88 In Canada, for 
example, although many public companies have a dominant or controlling 
shareholder, institutional investors have been highly influential in 
corporate governance matters.89 The Canadian Coalition for Good 
Governance (CCGC), which comprises forty-nine of Canada’s largest 
institutional investors,90 publishes a set of principles relating to 
shareholder monitoring and engagement in investee companies.91 
Stewardship codes can sometimes mutate by changing categories. In 
the United Kingdom, for example, the 2010 Stewardship Code effected a 
species-jump from the third category of investor-led code to the first 
category of regulator/quasi-regulator-sanctioned code.92 The 2009 Walker 
Review recommended that the U.K. Financial Reporting Council should 
ratify an existing investor-led code and transform it into the new 
Stewardship Code.93 The Walker Review anticipated that changing the 
issuing body would elevate the status of the Stewardship Code to equal 
that of the U.K. Combined Code.94 The Walker Review’s clear message 
was that regulator/quasi-regulator-sanctioned codes have more clout than 
investor-led codes. 
Recent developments in the United States fall within the third 
category of investor-led codes. In January 2017, the Investor Stewardship 
                                                     
 87. In 2013, a group of institutional investors, proxy advisers, and business representatives 
adopted a set of stewardship guidelines. See SWISS ASS’N OF PENSION FUND PROVIDERS ET AL., 
GUIDELINES FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS GOVERNING THE EXERCISING OF PARTICIPATION 
RIGHTS IN PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANIES (2013) (Switz.), https://www.ethosfund.ch/sites/ 
default/files/upload/publication/p432e_130121_Guidelines_for_institutional_investors.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X292-67DC]. One of the participants, Ethos, which comprises 228 Swiss pension 
funds and tax-exempt institutions, states that its aim is to promote “socially responsible investment 
(SRI) as well as a stable and prosperous socio-economic environment that safeguards the interests of 
civil society today and in the future.” Id. 
 88. See, e.g., ASSOGESTIONI, supra note 85. 
 89. Andrew MacDougall et al., Canada, in THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 77, 78 
(Willem J.L. Calkoen ed., 6th ed. 2016). Shareholder engagement and investor activism is also on the 
rise in Canadian companies. See id. at 88. There has also been “a growing focus not only by boards 
but also long-term active institutional shareholders on the importance of taking a longer-term 
perspective and avoiding decisions motivated solely by short-term results.” Id. at 90. 
 90. Id. at 78. 
 91. See CCGC 2010, supra note 84. 
 92. Fin. Reporting Council,  supra note 55. 
 93. See WALKER REVIEW, supra note 56, Recommendations 16 and 17. The investor-led code 
appropriated by the U.K. Financial Reporting Council was the Code on the Responsibilities of 
Institutional Investors, published by the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (ISC) in November 
2009, in response to mounting calls for institutional investors to hold companies to account. However, 
the origins of the U.K. Stewardship Code can be traced back even further to The Responsibilities of 
Institutional Shareholders and Agents: Statement of Principles, published by the ISC in 2002, and 
based upon the ISC’s 1991 statement, The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders in the UK. 
 94. WALKER REVIEW, supra note 56, Recommendation 17. 
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Group (ISG), a coalition of some of the largest U.S.-based and 
international asset owners and managers,95 released its Framework for US 
Stewardship and Governance.96 The stewardship framework for 
institutional investors97 and the corporate governance framework for listed 
U.S. companies98 each include a set of six principles. The first tenet of the 
corporate governance principles is that “[b]oards are accountable to 
shareholders,”99 and the first tenet of the stewardship principles is that 
“[i]nstitutional investors are accountable to those whose money they 
invest.”100 The corporate governance principles, in particular, send a 
strong message about the expectations of institutional investors in U.S.-
listed companies today. These expectations, which include adoption of a 
“one share-one vote” structure, are as follows:101 responsiveness to 
institutional investor concerns,102 strong independent board leadership,103 
and management incentive structures that promote the company’s long-
term strategy.104 
Although the ISG framework is voluntary, it has the backing of some 
of the world’s largest asset managers, including founding members, such 
                                                     
 95. The ISG comprises sixteen founding international institutional investors, which togther 
invest more than US$ 17 trillion in U.S. equity markets. See Inv. Stewardship Grp., Corporate 
Governance and Stewardship Principles, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/07/corporate-governance-and-stewardship-
principles/#more-78477 [https://perma.cc/4UBF-WSVR]. 
 96. See Abe M. Friedman, Investor Coalition Publishes US Stewardship Code, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Feb. 9, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/09/ 
investor-coalition-publishes-u-s-stewardship-code/ [https://perma.cc/4ZNT-H9E4]; see also Amanda 
White, Top US Funds Embrace Stewardship Code, TOP 1000 FUNDS.COM (Feb. 17, 2017), 
https://www.top1000funds.com/analysis/2017/02/17/top-us-funds-embrace-stewardship-code/ 
[https://perma.cc/4HME-Y34Q] (describing the adoption of the frameworks on stewardship and 
corporate governance in the United States as “long overdue”). 
 97. See INV. STEWARDSHIP GRP., THE PRINCIPLES: STEWARDSHIP FRAMEWORK FOR 
INSITUTIONAL INVESTORS  (Jan. 2017) [hereinafter ISG STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES], https://www. 
isgframework.org/stewardship-principles/ [https://perma.cc/X8SA-3K6F]. 
 98. See INV. STEWARDSHIP GRP., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR US LISTED 
COMPANIES: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR US LISTED COMPANIES  (Jan. 31, 2017) 
[hereinafter ISG CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES], https://www.isgframework.org/corporate-
governance-principles/ [https://perma.cc/F8EY-TFZC].  
 99. Id. Principle 1. 
 100. Id. Principle A. 
 101. See id. Principle 2; cf. Eleanor Bloxham, Snap Shouldn’t Have Been Allowed to Go to the 
Public Without Voting Rights, FORTUNE (Mar. 4, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/03/snap-ipo-non-
voting-stock/ [https://perma.cc/2LZN-6R5S] (Snap Inc.’s recent IPO, which included non-voting 
shares, was offered to the public). 
 102. See ISG CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 98, Principle 3. 
 103. See id. Principle 4. 
 104. See id. Principle 6. 
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as BlackRock, State Street Global Advisors, and Vanguard.105 BlackRock, 
in particular, is taking an increasingly active stewardship role on the 
international stage. In January 2017, BlackRock, which is estimated to be 
one of the top three shareholders in every company listed on the FTSE 
index, wrote to the chairmen of over 300 U.K. companies to announce that 
it would vote against executive pay increases unless they were linked to 
strong and sustainable long-term corporate performance.106 According to 
BlackRock, executives should not be rewarded for short-term rises in share 
price,107 and should only be granted increases in pay that are 
commensurate with increases received by rank-and-file employees.108 
BlackRock’s head of corporate governance stated that failure by U.K. 
companies to comply with these demands would “call into question the 
quality of the board.”109 Several U.K. companies have responded by 
reducing CEO pay.110 A corporate governance report of the U.K. House of 
Commons in early 2017 described these developments as 
“encouraging.”111 
A common theme in contemporary international stewardship codes, 
regardless of their issuing body, is the need for long-term investment 
horizons. As Australia’s Financial Services Council recently stated when 
issuing its new Governance and Asset Stewardship Standard, “[g]ood 
                                                     
 105. The other thirteen founding members of the ISG are CalSTRS; Florida State Board of 
Administration; GIC Private Limited (Singapore’s Sovereign Wealth Fund); Legal and General 
Investment Management; MFS Investment Management; MN Netherlands; PGGM, Royal Bank of 
Canada Global Asset Management; TIAA Investments; T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.; ValueAct 
Capital; Washington State Investment Board; and Wellington Management. Leading Investors Launch 
Historic Initiative Focused on U.S. Institutional Investor Stewardship and Corporate Governance, 
BUS. WIRE (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170131005949/en/Leading-
Investors-Launch-Historic-Initiative-Focused-U.S [https://perma.cc/X58E-P2HP]; see White, supra 
note 96. Interestingly, the ISG Framework for US Stewardship and Governance has the backing not 
only of institutional investors but also some activist hedge funds, such as ValueAct Capital and Trian 
Partners.  
 106. See Aimee Donellan & Simon Duke, BlackRock Lays Down the Law to Chairmen, SUNDAY 
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2017), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/blackrock-lays-down-the-law-to-chairmen-
78cssq2lj. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Angela Monaghan, World’s Largest Fund Manager Demands Cuts to Executive Pay 
and Bonuses, GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jan/15/ 
blackrock-demands-cuts-to-executive-pay-and-bonuses [https://perma.cc/T8S2-6FKW]. 
 109. Donellan & Duke, supra note 106. 
 110. Interestingly, the pressure to reduce executive pay has coincided with an increase in female 
CEOs. For example, it has been reported that Emma Walmsley, who became CEO of pharmaceutical 
giant GlaxoSmithKline in April 2017, will receive a significantly reduced pay package compared to 
her predecessor, Sir Andrew Witty. See Sarah Neville, New GSK Boss to be Paid Less Than 
Predecessor, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/dca9329c-08cd-11e7-97d1-
5e720a26771b. 
 111. BUS., ENERGY & INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY COMM., supra note 12, at 24.  
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stewardship supports companies with productive use of capital to generate 
long-term sustainable returns with the potential for societal gains.”112 
III. THE U.K. AND JAPANESE STEWARDSHIP CODES: SIMILARITIES, 
DIFFERENCES, AND REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS 
Many of the stewardship codes that now operate around the world 
are based on the 2012 U.K. Stewardship Code,113 the 2014 Japanese 
Stewardship Code, or both.114 Although these two codes share many 
common features, there are also intriguing differences in their approach to 
shareholder stewardship. 
The U.K. Stewardship Code consists of seven principles115 and oper-
ates on a “comply or explain” basis.116 The Code applies primarily to in-
stitutional investors and includes both asset owners and asset managers 
with equity holdings in U.K. listed companies,117 but it also extends to 
service providers such as proxy advisers and investment consultants.118 
The adoption of the Stewardship Code represented a shift away from the 
                                                     
 112. See Fin. Servs. Council, supra note 13. 
 113. See U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57. 
 114. JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66; see OECD 2015, supra note 5, at 29; EY, supra note 
61, at 2 ; Sullivan, supra note 5. 
 115. U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 6–10. Under these principles, institutional 
investors should  
(1) publicly disclose their policy on how they will discharge their stewardship 
responsibilities; (2) have a robust policy on managing conflicts of interest in 
relation to stewardship which should be publicly disclosed; (3) monitor their 
investee companies; (4) establish clear guidelines on when and how they will 
escalate their stewardship activities; (5) be willing to act collectively with other 
investors where appropriate; (6) have a clear policy on voting and disclosure of 
voting activity; (7) report periodically on their stewardship and voting 
activities.  
Id. at 5. 
 116. The “comply or explain” regulatory model derives from the report by the 1992 Committee 
on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury, in the United 
Kingdom. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
STEWARDSHIP 2016, 4 (Jan. 2017), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/ca1d9909-7e32-4894-b2a7-
b971b4406130/Developments-in-Corporate-Governance-and-Stewardship-2016.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Z7EK-6YRH]. In the context of the U.K. Stewardship Code, the “comply or explain” model 
requires that signatories to the code who choose not to comply with one or more of its principles should 
provide “meaningful explanations” for this non-conformity. See U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 
57, at 4. 
 117. The U.K. Stewardship Code describes “asset owners” as including “pension funds, 
insurance companies, investment trusts and other collective investment vehicles”, and states that, as 
providers of capital, these institutions “set the tone” for stewardship. “Asset managers” are those 
institutions with day-to-day investment management responsibility, and are, according to the Financial 
Reporting Council, “well positioned to influence companies’ long-term performance.” U.K. 
STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 1. 
 118. Id. at 2. 
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hands-off approach to corporate governance traditionally taken by U.K. 
institutional investors.119 The Code is aspirational in nature.120 It states that 
institutional investors, as providers of capital, “set the tone” for steward-
ship.121 One of the Code’s underlying premises is that institutional share-
holders have a non-delegable responsibility to engage with the companies 
in which they invest.122 This effectively parallels the views of U.S. Justice 
Brandeis, who wrote, over a century ago, that it is the shareholder’s “busi-
ness and his obligation to see that those who represent him carry out a 
policy which is consistent with the public welfare”.123 
The U.K. Stewardship Code encourages institutional investors to 
exercise their stewardship responsibilities in a variety of hands-on ways—
through voting, monitoring, and engaging in “purposeful dialogue” with 
companies about matters including strategy, performance, risk and 
corporate governance (including culture and executive pay).124 Some 
international codes, such as South Africa’s Code for Responsible Investing 
(CRISA)125 and the International Corporate Governance Network’s 
Global Stewardship Principles,126 go further than the U.K. Code on which 
                                                     
 119. Brian R. Cheffins, The Stewardship Code’s Achilles Heel, 73 MOD. L. REV. 1004, 1004–05 
(2010). 
 120. Some scholars, however, have argued that, as a concomitant of their growing power, activist 
investors should be subject to strict legal rules analogous to those that apply to directors and company 
officers. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn A. Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. 
L. REV.  1255 (2008). However, aspirational standards also play an important role in relation to 
directors’ conduct under Delaware law. See, e.g., ); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 
907 A.2d 693,752 (Del. Ch. 2005); Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary 
Duties, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 519, 537–38 (2012). 
 121. U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 1. 
 122. See U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 2; Kate Burgess, Myners Lashes Out at 
Landlord Shareholders, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/c0217c20-2eaf-
11de-b7d3-00144feabdc0; Jennifer Hughes, FSA Chief Lambasts Uncritical Investors, FIN. TIMES 
(Mar. 11, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/9edc7548-0e8d-11de-b099-0000779fd2ac. 
 123. Louis D. Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness, in MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D 
BRANDEIS, 75 (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1935). 
 124. U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 1, 6. 
 125. ESG factors are front and center of CRISA, which is based on the U.K. Stewardship Code. 
Principle 1 of CRISA states that “[a]n institutional investor should incorporate sustainability 
considerations, including ESG, into its investment analysis and investment activities as part of the 
delivery of superior risk-adjusted returns to the ultimate beneficiaries”. See INST. OF DIR. S. AFR., 
supra note 79, Principle 1. The focus on ESG under this Code also reflects the United Nations’s 
Principles for Responsible Investment.  See id. at 4. 
 126. See INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK, ICGN GLOBAL STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES, 
Principle 6 (2016), https://www.icgn.org/sites/default/files/ICGNGlobalStewardshipPrinciples.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HZR9-P77J] (“Promoting long-term value creation and integration of 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors.”). 
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they are modelled127 by emphasizing the role of institutional investors in 
promoting environmental, social and governance (ESG) policies. 
Despite the U.K. Stewardship Code’s strong claims about its 
beneficial qualities,128 not all commentators are equally sanguine. Some 
scholars have raised doubts about the Code’s philosophical foundations,129 
while others have suggested the Code’s effectiveness may be 
compromised by its voluntary “comply or explain” nature.130 Another 
possible obstacle to its success is the relatively low level of equity held by 
domestic institutional investors in U.K.-listed companies today.131 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the proclaimed economic benefits 
of the U.K. Stewardship Code were sufficiently tempting to prompt its 
transplantation in Japan in 2014, as part of a broad suite of monetary and 
fiscal policy reforms adopted by the Abe government.132 The goal of these 
reforms, colloquially known as “Abenomics,” was to improve corporate 
productivity and “earning power,”133 thereby benefiting the entire 
                                                     
 127. See Catherine Howarth, Institutional Investors are the Ghosts at the AGM Feast, FIN. TIMES  
(May 15, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/c9c3a6dc-30e4-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a (criticizing the 
absence of any reference to oversight of social and environmental risks under the U.K. Stewardship 
Code). Note, however, that the U.K. Financial Reporting Council has stated that, as part of its recent 
tiering exercise, many signatories to the U.K. Stewardship Code chose to include more information 
about ESG matters in their statements, even though the U.K. Code does not explicitly refer to ESG. 
See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 116, at 25, 27. 
 128. U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 1. 
 129. Professor Alan Dignam has argued, for example, that the stewardship movement is a 
dangerous and misguided development because it mischaracterizes shareholders as passive and 
blameless in the global financial crisis. See Dignam 2013, supra note 44; see also Bruner 2011, supra 
note 44, at 310. 
 130. Cheffins, supra note 119, at 1013–14; Eva Micheler, Facilitating Investor Engagement and 
Stewardship, 14 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 29, 45 (2013);  see also Howarth, supra note 127 
(complaining that large investors, which still predominantly vote with management, “face no 
meaningful sanction” if they fail to act as responsible stewards under the Code). 
 131. Cheffins, supra note 119, at 115; Davies, supra note 12, at 356. Nonetheless, the Financial 
Reporting Council has indicated that it considers the quality and quantity of stewardship to have 
improved markedly since the Stewardship Code was introduced in 2010. See FIN. REPORTING 
COUNCIL, supra note 116, at 24. In 2016, the Financial Reporting Council placed more pressure on 
signatories in relation to their stewardship responsibilities by undertaking a “tiering exercise.” This 
exercise publicly ranked U.K. Stewardship Code signatories into three tiers, serving as a means of 
encouraging signatories to reaffirm their commitment to stewardship and provide high quality 
explanations of their stewardship engagement. See generally id. at 24. According to the Financial 
Reporting Council, the number of signatories in the highest ranking, Tier 1, has increased significantly 
as a result of the exercise. Id. at 26. 
 132. See JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66. 
 133. See Nicholas Benes, Corporate Governance Reform in Japan, ETHICAL BOARDROOM (Apr. 
15, 2015), https://ethicalboardroom.com/corporate-governance-reform-in-japan/ [https://perma.cc/ 
W52X-AT9Q]. 
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Japanese economy.134 Japan’s Stewardship Code fell within Abenomics’ 
“third arrow,”135 which included a number of other significant corporate 
governance reforms.136 The ultimate policy goal of the “third arrow” 
reforms was not solely to benefit shareholders, but to distribute the 
rewards of improved profitability to corporate stakeholders generally, via 
expanded employment opportunities, increased wages, and higher 
dividend payments.137 
Contrary to popular Western belief, shareholders in Japan possess 
relatively strong legal rights.138 They include statutory rights to alter the 
corporate constitution without board consent; to elect directors by majority 
vote in both contested and uncontested board elections; and to nominate 
directors on the company’s ballot. 139 Although Japan is a civil law 
                                                     
 134. See PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND HIS CABINET, JAPAN REVITALIZATION STRATEGY 2 
(June 2014), https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/pdf/honbunEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6TYS-WD27]; Societé Generale, A New Dawn Rising for Japan’s Stocks?, BARRONS (June 4, 2015), 
http://www.barrons.com/articles/a-new-dawn-rising-for-japanese-stocks-1433386067. 
 135. Namely the Japan Revitalization Strategy. The other two arrows for economic revitalization 
were (i) aggressive monetary policy; and (ii) flexible fiscal policy, including public works spending. 
See Reform in Japan: The Third Arrow, ECONOMIST (June 26, 2014), https://www.economist.com/ 
news/leaders/21605905-shinzo-abe-has-best-chance-decades-changing-japan-better-he-seems-poised 
[https://perma.cc/PGA8-A96F]; see also G20 AUSTL., COMPREHENSIVE GROWTH STRATEGY: JAPAN 
2014, at 2–6 (2014), http://g20.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/g20_comprehensive_ 
growth_strategy_japan.pdf [https://perma.cc/2C74-BK2W].  
 136. These reforms included the introduction of a Corporate Governance Code. See JPX TOKYO 
STOCK EXCHANGE, JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, SEEKING SUSTAINABLE CORPORATE 
GROWTH AND INCREASED CORPORATE VALUE OVER THE MID-TO LONG-TERM (June 1, 2015), 
http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/listing/cg/tvdivq0000008jdy-att/20150513.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2WRZ-NQX2]. The reforms also sought to increase the number of outside directors. See 
Kazuaki Nagata, New Rules are Pushing Japanese Corporations to Tap More Outside Directors, 
JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/04/27/reference/ 
new-rules-pushing-japanese-corporations-tap-outside-directors/ [https://perma.cc/WBJ2-D9AN]. The 
reforms also introduced a new stock index, the JPX-Nikkei 400, with entry requirements of superior 
profits and governance practices. See JPX-NIKKEI 400, JAPAN EXCH. GRP. (July 29, 2016), 
http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/derivatives/products/domestic/jpx-nikkei400options/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/VJR3-EE4G]; Corporate Governance in Japan: A Revolution in the Making, 
ECONOMIST (May 3, 2014), https://www.economist.com/news/business/21601557-long-last-
japanese-firms-seem-be-coming-under-proper-outside-scrutiny-revolution [https://perma.cc/K78D-
G9TN]Benes, supra note 133; PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND HIS CABINET, supra note 134, at 107.  
 137. PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND HIS CABINET, supra note 134, at 35. 
 138. See Gen Goto, Legally “Strong” Shareholders of Japan, 3 MICH. BUS. & 
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 125 (2014); see also Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: 
The Hidden Problems of Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189 (2000). This 
was not always the case. According to Franks et al., in the first half of the 20th century, Japan had 
weak legal protection, accompanied by dispersed ownership. However, in the second half of the 
century, after World War II, Japan was characterized by strong legal rights and consolidated, 
interlocking share ownership. See Julian Franks et al., The Ownership of Japanese Corporations in 
the 20th Century, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2580. 
 139. See generally Goto, supra note 138. 
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jurisdiction, these shareholder rights closely parallel those in some 
common law jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
Australia.140 Also, staggered boards are ineffective in these jurisdictions 
because shareholders have an absolute right to remove public company 
directors from office at any time.141 Many of the statutorily protected 
shareholder rights in these jurisdictions are, however, absent, or available 
by private ordering (such as in the United States under Delaware law.142 
In spite of the existence of strong shareholder rights in Japan, 
investor activism there has historically been rare, fraught with difficulty,143 
and viewed with suspicion.144 The most significant constraint on 
institutional investor activism was the existence of cross-shareholding 
(kabushiki mochiai),145 which insulated management from outside 
shareholder influence. Some scholars have viewed cross-shareholding as 
the functional equivalent of U.S.-style poison pills.146 
Japan’s “third arrow” reforms were considered to be revolutionary in 
terms of their potential effect on corporate governance and shareholder 
activism.147 The Stewardship Code, in particular, deliberately created a 
                                                     
 140. See generally Jennifer G. Hill, Subverting Shareholder Rights: Lessons from News Corp’s 
Migration to Delaware, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2010) for a discussion of Anglo–Australian shareholder 
rights compared to shareholder rights under Delaware law. For a comparative description of 
shareholder rights under Canadian law and Delaware law, see MacDougall et al., supra note 89, at 86–
88. 
 141. The statutory right to remove directors from office by ordinary resolution cannot be altered 
in the constitution or by agreement. See Companies Act, 2006 c. 46 § 168(1) (U.K.); Canada Business 
Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-44, § 109(1) (Can.); Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 
1990 c. B. 16, § 122(1) (Ontario); Corporations Act 2001 § 203D (Austl.). A controversial provision 
of the UK Corporate Governance Code, Principle B.7.1, further provides that all directors of FTSE 
300 companies should be subject to annual election by shareholders. See FIN. REP. COUNCIL, THE UK 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE Principle B.7.1 (Sept. 2014), https://www.frc.org.uk/ 
getattachment/59a5171d-4163-4fb2-9e9d-daefcd7153b5/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-2014.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/2D4W-BY5T ]. 
 142. See Goto, supra note 138, at 128–39, for a detailed comparative analysis of shareholder 
rights in Japan and Delaware. 
 143. See, e.g., T. Boone Pickens, The Heck With Japanese Business – Texas Entrepreneur Not 
Interested in Competing with a Cartel System, SEATTLE TIMES (June 9, 1991), http://community. 
seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19910609&slug=1287976. 
 144. Ben McLannahan, Japan Investors Face UK-Style Financial Code, FIN. TIMES  (Dec. 26, 
2013), https://www.ft.com/content/b104a886-6e36-11e3-8dff-00144feabdc0. 
 145. See Goto, supra note 138, at 126, 128. 
 146. Takaaki Eguchi & Zenichi Shishido, The Future of Japanese Corporate Governance: 
Japan’s Internal Governance and Development of Japanese-Style External Governance Through 
Engagement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 552, 559–60 (Jennifer G. Hill & 
Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015); CURTIS MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM: 
WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
AROUND THE WORLD 102 (2008); David Skeel, Governance in the Ruins, 122 HARV. L. REV. 696, 
707 (2008). 
 147. Benes, supra note 133; Corporate Governance in Japan, supra note 136. 
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“warmer climate” for foreign investors and shareholder activists,148 in 
accordance with the view that activism can be beneficial to 
underperforming companies.149 Since the introduction of the Code, there 
has been a rise in the number of shareholder-initiated proposals,150 and 
foreign investors have had an increasing influence on voting results.151 
Activism to date has typically been harnessed to end “corporate cash-
hoarding,” which was prevalent in many Japanese companies.152 
The jury is still out on whether the Japanese Stewardship Code will 
ultimately achieve its policy objectives. Sign-on to the Japanese 
Stewardship Code has been uneven among market participants. Although 
more than 150 asset managers have signed on to the Code,153 corporate 
pension funds have all but ignored it. Some commentators claim that the 
absence of major Japanese companies, such as Toyota, Panasonic and 
Sony, from the list of signatories threatens the viability of the Code.154 
                                                     
 148. Ben McLannahan, Japanese Reformists Face Challenge Over Shake-Up of Corporate 
Governance Laws, FIN. TIMES (May 25, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/e1e9babc-dff7-11e3-
b709-00144feabdc0; see SADAKAZU OSAKI, NOMURA RES. INST., KEYS TO SUCCESS OF JAPANESE 
STEWARDSHIP CODE 5 (July 4, 2014), https://www.nri.com/~/media/PDF/global/opinion/lakyara/ 
2014/lkr2014199.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5PL-R99F]. 
 149. This view has been expressed in relation to some recent activist shareholder campaigns in 
Australia. See, e.g., Tony Boyd, Ardent Board Under Pressure as Shareholders Revolt, AUSTL. FIN. 
REV.: CHANTICLEER (July 7, 2017, 6:26 PM), http://www.afr.com/brand/chanticleer/ardent-board-
under-pressure-as-shareholders-revolt-20170706-gx6fkp [https://perma.cc/V7HW-4DS9]. Boyd 
described the campaign against Ardent Leisure as “a textbook example of shareholder activism at its 
best.” Id.; see also Glenda Korporaal, Gary Weiss’s Ariadne Attacks Ardent Leisure Board, AUSTL. 
BUS. REV. (July 7, 2017), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/companies/gary-weisss-ariadne-
attacks-ardent-leisure-board/news-story/d3e9526d86c8da8dd62a67de2c1c57e2; Tony Boyd, BHP on 
Track to Shed Its Chronic Underperformance, AUSTL. FIN. REV.: CHANTICLEER (Aug. 22, 2017), 
http://www.afr.com/brand/chanticleer/bhp-on-track-to-shed-its-chronic-underperformance-
20170822-gy1rno. 
 150. See Ben McLannahan, Shareholder Activism Extends Reach Across Japanese Boardrooms, 
FIN. TIMES (June 23, 2014). 
 151. See Kenta Kurihara, Japan’s Shareholder Meetings: New Governance Code Ups Pressure 
on Management, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (June 9, 2015), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Trends/New-
governance-code-ups-pressure-on-management [https://perma.cc/78Q3-KDC5]. 
 152. Megumi Fujikawa & Eric Pfanner, In Japan, Dividends, Buybacks Take the Stage: 
Shareholders Grow More Active: Companies Respond, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2014), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-japan-dividends-buybacks-take-the-stage-1403711174. 
 153. See COUNCIL OF EXPERTS ON THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS,  JAPAN’S STEWARDSHIP CODE 1 (May 29, 2017), http://www. 
fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/20170529/02.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NBA-SJGY] (revised 
Stewardship Code with tracked changes from the 2014 version). 
 154. See Leo Lewis, Secom Breaks Ranks to Highlight Reform Failures of Japan Inc., FIN. TIMES 
(May 24, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/3ad40558-3fac-11e7-9d56-25f963e998b2; Leo Lewis, 
Companies Fail to Buy into Japan’s Stewardship Code, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2016), 
https://www.ft.com/content/138e73b4-98d3-11e6-8f9b-70e3cabccfae; see also Leo Lewis, Japan’s 
Missing Shareholder Activism, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/67599fde-
1dce-11e7-b7d3-163f5a7f229c (describing Japan’s corporate governance reforms as looking “wobbly 
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Recent amendments to the Code are aimed at addressing these and other 
concerns about the Code’s effectiveness.155 For example, some of these 
new provisions place increased pressure on asset owners themselves to 
undertake stewardship, rather than merely relying on asset managers.156 
The 2012 U.K. Stewardship Code and its Japanese counterpart share 
many common features in terms of regulatory structure, design, and 
content. Both Codes are voluntary and regulator-initiated, and both adopt 
a principles-based “comply or explain” approach, which, although a 
familiar feature of U.K. corporate governance, was entirely new to 
Japan.157 The Codes apply to all listed companies in each jurisdiction, and 
include not only asset owners and asset managers158 but also proxy 
advisers.159 Finally, although recognizing that investors play an important 
accountability role, both Codes stress that this does not entitle them to 
manage the company’s affairs.160 
In spite of these broad similarities, there are also some fundamental 
differences between the 2012 U.K. Stewardship Code and the 2014 
Japanese Stewardship Code. For a start, they constituted regulatory 
                                                     
of late”); cf. Leo Lewis, Underperforming Companies Face Intense AGM Season, FIN. TIMES  (June 
25, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/0d3bd186-5972-11e7-9bc8-8055f264aa8b; Leo Lewis, 
Japanese Investors’ Pitchfork Moment, FIN. TIMES (June 19, 2017), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/88fd8a46-54d4-11e7-9fed-c19e2700005f (suggesting that underperforming Japanese 
companies are increasing vulnerable to institutional investors, who are themselves subject to growing 
pressure to hold corporate management to account). 
 155. See generally COUNSEL OF EXPERTS ON THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 153. 
 156. See id. Principles 1-3, 1-5. Other notable changes are the introduction of greater specificity 
into some principles (see, for example, Principle 2 dealing with management of conflicts of interest 
by institutional investors) and a new recommendation for institutional investors to disclose how they 
voted on all proposals of their investee companies. Id. at Principles 5-3. It appears that the new 
provision relating to disclosure of voting records is already having an impact. A recent survey of 
ninety-six companies from the Nikkei Stock Average found that 67% of them saw a decline in “yes” 
votes for proposals to appoint new senior managers. See Japan’s Corporate Governance Gets Some 
Long Over-due Scrutiny, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (July 6, 2017), https://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/ 
20170706/On-the-Cover/Japan-s-corporate-governance-gets-some-long-overdue-scrutiny [https:// 
perma.cc/4XCJ-QZJ3]. 
 157. See JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66, at 4, 13; OSAKI, supra note 148, at 2–3. 
 158. The U.K. Stewardship Code applies equally to asset owners and asset managers. See U.K. 
STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 2. However, see Howarth, supra note 127, for criticism of this 
aspect of the U.K. Code in the light of the different roles and responsibilities of asset owners and asset 
managers. Although Japan’s Stewardship Code also applies to both asset owners and asset managers, 
it outlines different expectations for each group. See JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66; COUNSEL 
OF EXPERTS ON THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 153. 
 159. See U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 2; JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66, at 
3. The 2017 revisions to the Japanese Stewardship Code contain a new provision aimed specifically 
at proxy advisors, which requires them, inter alia, to “dedicate sufficient management resources to 
ensure sound judgement in the evaluation of companies.” See COUNSEL OF EXPERTS ON THE 
STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 153, at  Principle 5-5. 
 160. U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 1; JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66, at 2. 
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responses to quite different policy problems. A central policy factor 
underpinning the U.K. Stewardship Code was the need for effective risk 
control in the post-crisis era.161 The Japanese version, however, was far 
more focused on arresting declining profitability, unlocking value, and 
increasing investor returns.162 Reflecting these goals, the mantras of 
“sustainable growth” and “medium to long-term corporate value” recur 
throughout the Japanese Code.163 Another difference relates to ESG issues. 
Unlike the U.K. Code, the Japanese specifically refers to ESG as a relevant 
factor for investors monitoring the companies in which they invest.164 
The most significant differences between the two Codes, however, 
relate to the issue of investor activism. First, the Codes take divergent 
approaches to activism intensity. The kind of shareholder engagement 
envisaged by the 2014 Japanese Stewardship Code is relatively gentle. For 
example, the Code urges institutional investors to engage in “constructive 
dialogue”165 with management, rather than intervention.166 In spite of this 
consensus-style language in the Japanese Code, however, the clear 
message of the Code is that there must be more active communication 
                                                     
 161. WALKER REVIEW, supra note 56, at 6, 12, 24–25. 
 162. See Chie Aoyagi & Giovanni Ganelli, Unstash the Cash! Corporate Governance in Japan 
(IMF Asia Pacific Department, Working Paper 14/140, 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14140.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX56-S3SW]; Benes, supra note 133;  Fujikawa & 
Pfanner, supra note 152. There were also concerns about the passivity of institutional investors in 
relation to the 2011–2012 Olympus accounting scandal. See Bruce E. Aronson, The Olympus Scandal 
and Corporate Governance Reform: Can Japan Find a Middle Ground Between the Board Monitoring 
Model and Management Model?, 30 PAC. BASIN L. REV. 93, 106–14 (2012); Corporate Governance 
in Japan, supra note 136. 
 163. See generally JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66. For example, “stewardship 
responsibilities” are defined in the code to refer to “the responsibilities of institutional investors to 
enhance the medium- to long-term investment return for their clients and beneficiaries.” Id. at 1. The 
code also includes Principle 7 (which has no complement in the U.K. code), stating that  
[t]o contribute positively to the sustainable growth of investee companies, 
institutional investors should have in-depth knowledge of the investee 
companies and their business environment and skills and resources needed to 
appropropriately engage with the companies and make proper judgments in 
fulfilling their stewardship activities.  
Id. at 6, 13; see also COUNSEL OF EXPERTS ON THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 153, Principle 4-
2. 
 164. See JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66, at 9. Whereas Japan’s 2014 Stewardship Code 
refers to “risks arising from social and environmental matters”, this wording has been changed in the 
2017 revisions to “risks and opportunities arising from social and environmental matters” [emphasis 
added]. See COUNCIL OF EXPERTS ON JAPAN’S STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 153, at 12. 
 165. The reference to “constructive dialogue” is replicated throughout Japan’s Corporate 
Governance Code. See JPX TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 136. 
 166. JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66, at 10. The Japanese Stewardship Code did, however, 
contemplate that institutional investors might wish to exchange views with other shareholders. Id. at 
13. 
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between the board and shareholders,167 and an end to the “quiet-life 
equilibrium”168 of many Japanese companies.169 
The U.K. Stewardship Code, on the other hand, is far less ambiguous 
in its approach to activism intensity. It provides a clear framework for the 
escalation of activist conduct, if the board of directors is unresponsive to 
shareholder concerns. The U.K. Code states that institutional investors 
should establish guidelines as to “when and how” they will intensify 
pressure on management. Principle 4 of the Code lists various escalating 
actions that institutional investors might use. These include expressing 
their concerns at additional meetings with management or through the 
company’s advisers; making public statements prior to shareholder 
meetings; and requisitioning shareholder meetings to remove directors 
from office.170 Shareholders have statutorily entrenched rights under U.K. 
corporate law to convene meetings,171 as well as an absolute right to 
remove directors from office at any time.172 
In the U.S. context, the tone used in the new ISG stewardship 
principles173 falls somewhere between the Japanese and U.K. approaches. 
At first sight, the ISG stewardship principles appear to be close to the 
Japanese model, adopting consensus-style language, which urges 
institutional investors to attempt to resolve differences with management 
in a “constructive and pragmatic manner.”174 Yet, the stewardship 
principles also foreshadow stronger action by investors, à la the U.K. 
model, if management is unresponsive to their concerns.175 The ISG 
stewardship principles, particularly in combination with the 
complementary ISG corporate governance principles,176 clearly indicate 
that constructive and pragmatic engagement will have its limits. 
                                                     
 167. Eguchi & Shishido, supra note 146, at 564. 
 168. Id. See generally Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? 
Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043, 1047 (2003). 
 169. Eguchi & Shishido, supra note 146, at 559, 564. See Attracta Mooney, Japanese Asset 
Managers Will Reveal AGM Votes, FIN. TIMES (June 4, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
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 170. U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 8. 
 171. See Companies Act, 2006 c. 46, §§ 303–305  (U.K.). 
 172. See id. § 168(1) (U.K.). 
 173. ISG STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 97. 
 174. Id. Principle E (“Institutional investors should address and attempt to resolve differences 
with companies in a constructive and pragmatic manner.”). Principle E.2 (“Institutional investors 
should engage with companies in a manner that is intended to build a foundation of trust and common 
understanding.”).  
 175. See id. Principle E.4 (“Institutional investors should disclose, in general, what further 
actions they may take in the event they are dissatisfied with the outcome of their engagement efforts.”). 
 176. ISG CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 98. 
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A second major difference between the Codes relates to collective 
activism. Consistent with its consensus-style approach to shareholder 
engagement, the 2014 Japanese Stewardship Code contains no principle 
endorsing collective activism, although the Code’s 2017 revisions now 
contemplate at least some form of collaborative engagement between 
institutional investors.177 In contrast, several principles in the U.K. 
Stewardship Code refer to, and implicitly support, collective activism by 
institutional investors. For example, one of the enumerated ways in which 
investors can increase pressure on management under Principle 4 is by 
“intervening jointly with other institutions on particular issues.”178 
Principle 5 states further that “[i]nstitutional investors should be willing to 
act collectively with other investors where appropriate.”179 In fact, 
institutional investors in the United Kingdom have a long history of 
engaging in coordinated action, not only to influence management of 
investee companies directly, but also to influence the setting of legal rules 
that determine the balance of power between shareholders and 
management.180 The Financial Reporting Council has also encouraged 
greater collaboration between international and U.K.-based institutional 
investors, possibly as an antidote to the low level of equity held by 
domestic institutional investors.181 This suggests a form of “transnational 
agency capitalism,” where global institutional investors may be willing to 
follow the lead, and join forces with, more aggressive local investors.182 
In the United States, the ISG’s new stewardship principles are more 
tentative and ambiguous than the U.K. Stewardship Code. Although the 
new ISG stewardship principles refer to collaboration between 
                                                     
 177. See COUNSEL OF EXPERTS ON THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 153, at 13. A newly-
introduced Principle 4-4 states that “[i]n addition to institutional investors engaging with investee 
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 178. U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 8. 
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 180. See Davies, supra note 12, at 355. 
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Investors Try to Unseat Chairman, FIN. TIMES  (May 7, 2012), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
d4d3a330-9812-11e1-ad3e-00144feabdc0?mhq5j=e6. 
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institutional investors, this collaboration appears to be directed at 
encouraging the adoption and implementation of corporate 
governance/stewardship principles, rather than engaging in collective 
activism per se.183 
One of the regulatory implications of collective activism is that it 
may create a tension between corporate governance principles and 
takeover rules. Many jurisdictions restrict shareholders from “acting in 
concert” under their respective takeover regimes.184 Some regulators have 
sought to defuse this tension by favoring coordinated shareholder 
conduct185 over takeover rules.186 Other regulators have attempted the 
difficult task of differentiating between “good” and “bad” collective 
activism, with the aim of encouraging the former and deterring the latter 
control-seeking type of activism.187 In the United States, however, former 
SEC Chair Mary Jo White considered that regulators should take an 
agnostic stance on whether particular activists, and activist campaigns, are 
“good” or “bad.” Instead, she asserted that the role of regulators should 
merely be to ensure that shareholders have sufficient information and that 
“all play by the rules.”188 Yet another regulatory approach is to equate 
long-term corporate commitment with “good” activism and, on that basis, 
restrict the legal rights of short-term shareholders. The SEC’s ill-fated 
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attempt to introduce a proxy access rule189 provided an example of the use 
of shareholding periods as a filtering device to determine which 
shareholders be accorded participatory rights in corporate governance. 
The requirement of a three-year holding was a direct response to concerns 
that the proxy access rule might be used by short-term (aka “bad”) 
activists.190 The SEC stated that it believed this holding period requirement 
“reflects our goal of limiting use of the rule to significant long-term 
holders.”191 
CONCLUSION 
There is a Manichean divide in international corporate governance 
today when it comes to shareholder engagement and activism. These 
positive and negative narratives of shareholder influence have important 
regulatory consequences. 
The idea that activist shareholders are short-termist and that activism 
is dangerous to corporations and society as a whole is a powerful theme in 
contemporary U.S. corporate law literature. Some of the regulatory 
implications of this model are that shareholders’ participatory rights in 
corporate governance should be limited, and that an important goal of 
corporate law is to protect the corporation from certain investors. 
However, a very different paradigm is emerging in many other 
countries. In these jurisdictions, shareholder participation is actively 
encouraged, with institutional investors viewed as a central accountability 
mechanism and as integral to long-term sustainable corporate profitability. 
Far from being treated as part of the problem, institutional investors and 
shareholder activism are increasingly viewed as part of the solution. 
The recent proliferation of stewardship codes reflects this emerging 
paradigm. This trend signals the growing importance of institutional 
investors in a globalized investment world. Stewardship codes have come 
late to the United States, in the form of the 2017 ISG stewardship 
principles, but they have not arrived in a vacuum. These codes are part of 
a sustained international push for greater investor involvement in 
corporate governance. They also exemplify the increasing globalization of 
corporate governance itself, which will inevitably result in calls for 
stronger shareholder participation rights and higher levels of investor 
engagement in the United States. 
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